Does the metaphysical dog wag its formal tail? The free-energy principle and philosophical debates about life, mind, and matter.
Journal
The Behavioral and brain sciences
ISSN: 1469-1825
Titre abrégé: Behav Brain Sci
Pays: England
ID NLM: 7808666
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
29 09 2022
29 09 2022
Historique:
entrez:
29
9
2022
pubmed:
30
9
2022
medline:
1
10
2022
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
According to Bruineberg and colleagues, philosophical arguments on life, mind, and matter that are based on the free-energy principle (FEP) (1) essentially draw on the Markov blanket construct and (2) tend to assume that strong metaphysical claims can be justified on the basis of metaphysically innocuous formal assumptions provided by FEP. I argue against both (1) and (2).
Identifiants
pubmed: 36172751
doi: 10.1017/S0140525X22000292
pii: S0140525X22000292
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Comment
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
e216Commentaires et corrections
Type : CommentOn
Type : CommentIn