Cooperating to show that you care: costly helping as an honest signal of fitness interdependence.
altruism
costly signalling
food sharing
stake
trust
welfare trade-off ratio
Journal
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences
ISSN: 1471-2970
Titre abrégé: Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
Pays: England
ID NLM: 7503623
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
22 11 2021
22 11 2021
Historique:
entrez:
4
10
2021
pubmed:
5
10
2021
medline:
1
2
2022
Statut:
ppublish
Résumé
Social organisms often need to know how much to trust others to cooperate. Organisms can expect cooperation from another organism that depends on them (i.e. stake or fitness interdependence), but how do individuals assess fitness interdependence? Here, we extend fitness interdependence into a signalling context: costly helping behaviour can honestly signal one's stake in others, such that those who help are trusted more. We present a mathematical model in which agents help others based on their stake in the recipient's welfare, and recipients use that information to assess whom to trust. At equilibrium, helping is a costly signal of stake: helping is worthwhile for those who value the recipient (and thus will repay any trust), but is not worthwhile for those who do not value the recipient (and thus will betray the trust). Recipients demand signals when they value the signallers less and when the cost of betrayed trust is higher; signal costs are higher when signallers have more incentive to defect. Signalling systems are more likely when the trust games resemble Prisoner's Dilemmas, Stag Hunts or Harmony Games, and are less likely in Snowdrift Games. Furthermore, we find that honest signals need not benefit recipients and can even occur between hostile parties. By signalling their interdependence, organisms benefit from increased trust, even when no future interactions will occur. This article is part of the theme issue 'The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling'.
Identifiants
pubmed: 34601912
doi: 10.1098/rstb.2020.0292
pmc: PMC8487747
doi:
Banques de données
figshare
['10.6084/m9.figshare.17088950']
Types de publication
Journal Article
Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Research Support, U.S. Gov't, Non-P.H.S.
Langues
eng
Sous-ensembles de citation
IM
Pagination
20200292Références
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