(How) does RBF strengthen strategic purchasing of health care? Comparing the experience of Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
DRC
Mother and child health care
Performance-based financing
Results-based financing
Strategic purchasing
Uganda
Zimbabwe
Journal
Global health research and policy
ISSN: 2397-0642
Titre abrégé: Glob Health Res Policy
Pays: England
ID NLM: 101705789
Informations de publication
Date de publication:
2019
2019
Historique:
received:
14
01
2019
accepted:
15
01
2019
entrez:
9
2
2019
pubmed:
9
2
2019
medline:
9
2
2019
Statut:
epublish
Résumé
Results-Based Financing (RBF) has proliferated in health sectors of low and middle income countries, especially fragile and conflict-affected ones, and has been presented as a way of reforming and strengthening strategic purchasing. However, few studies have empirically examined how RBF impacts on health care purchasing in these settings. This article examines the effects of several RBF programmes on health care purchasing functions in three fragile and post-conflict settings: Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over the past decade. The article is based on a documentary review, including 110 documents from 2004 to 2018, and 98 key informant (KI) interviews conducted with international, national and district level stakeholders in early 2018 in the selected districts of the three countries. Interviews and analysis followed an adapted framework for strategic purchasing, which was also used to compare across the case studies. Across the cases, at the government level, we find little change to the accountability of purchasers, but RBF does mobilise additional resources to support entitlements. In relation to the population, RBF appears to bring in improvements in specifying and informing about entitlements for some services. However, the engagement and consultation with the population on their needs was found to be limited. In relation to providers, RBF did not impact in any major way on provider accreditation and selection, or on treatment guidelines. However, it did introduce a more contractual relationship for some providers and bring about (at least partial) improvements in provider payment systems, data quality, increased financial autonomy for primary providers and enforcing equitable strategies. More generally, RBF has been a source of much-needed revenue at primary care level in under-funded health systems. The context - particularly the degree of stability and authority of government-, the design of the RBF programme and the potential for effective integration of RBF in existing systems and its stage of development were key factors behind differences observed. Our evidence suggests that expectations of RBF as an instrument of systemic reform should be nuanced, while focusing instead on expanding the key areas of potential gain and ensuring better integration and institutionalisation, towards which two of the three case study countries are working.
Sections du résumé
BACKGROUND
BACKGROUND
Results-Based Financing (RBF) has proliferated in health sectors of low and middle income countries, especially fragile and conflict-affected ones, and has been presented as a way of reforming and strengthening strategic purchasing. However, few studies have empirically examined how RBF impacts on health care purchasing in these settings. This article examines the effects of several RBF programmes on health care purchasing functions in three fragile and post-conflict settings: Uganda, Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) over the past decade.
METHODS
METHODS
The article is based on a documentary review, including 110 documents from 2004 to 2018, and 98 key informant (KI) interviews conducted with international, national and district level stakeholders in early 2018 in the selected districts of the three countries. Interviews and analysis followed an adapted framework for strategic purchasing, which was also used to compare across the case studies.
RESULTS
RESULTS
Across the cases, at the government level, we find little change to the accountability of purchasers, but RBF does mobilise additional resources to support entitlements. In relation to the population, RBF appears to bring in improvements in specifying and informing about entitlements for some services. However, the engagement and consultation with the population on their needs was found to be limited. In relation to providers, RBF did not impact in any major way on provider accreditation and selection, or on treatment guidelines. However, it did introduce a more contractual relationship for some providers and bring about (at least partial) improvements in provider payment systems, data quality, increased financial autonomy for primary providers and enforcing equitable strategies. More generally, RBF has been a source of much-needed revenue at primary care level in under-funded health systems. The context - particularly the degree of stability and authority of government-, the design of the RBF programme and the potential for effective integration of RBF in existing systems and its stage of development were key factors behind differences observed.
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
Our evidence suggests that expectations of RBF as an instrument of systemic reform should be nuanced, while focusing instead on expanding the key areas of potential gain and ensuring better integration and institutionalisation, towards which two of the three case study countries are working.
Identifiants
pubmed: 30734000
doi: 10.1186/s41256-019-0094-2
pii: 94
pmc: PMC6354347
doi:
Types de publication
Journal Article
Langues
eng
Pagination
3Déclaration de conflit d'intérêts
Ethics approval was obtained from Queen Margaret University’s Research Ethics Panel. Additional ethics clearance for primary data collected at country level was also granted by the Makerere University School of Public Health, Ethics Review Board, and the Uganda National Council for Science and technology (SS4500), as well as the Medical Research Council of Zimbabwe (MRCZ/A/2265). The study also received authorisation from the MoHCC in Zimbabwe. Informed consent was obtained from all participants.Not applicable.The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
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